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Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought (Oxford and 
new York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 290 pp .
Peter Carruthers is one of the most famous and most successful contemporary 
philosophers of mind . He has specialised in philosophy of mind informed 
and guided by the results of cognitive science . Carruthers has been known to 
call himself a theoretical psychologist, in comparison with theoretical physicists, 
who rarely preform experiments themselves but only use the results of experi-
mental physicists to construct their theories . Similarly, Carruthers constructs 
theories about the mind based on the results of the empirical experiments . 
Currently he is employed at the University of Maryland and before that he 
was a professor of philosophy at University of Sheffield . Ha was the founder 
and the director of Hang Seng Center for the Cognitive Studies.
Most of Carruthers’s work is systematic which means that most of his 
books are interconnected, both by subject problems and by solutions to those 
problems . The Centered Mind has the most connections with his last book The 
Opacity of Mind (2011) . In The Opacity of Mind, Carruthers argues for the 
claim that we never have introspective access to our propositional attitudes . 
People have introspective access only to sensory-based representations, but 
our propositional attitudes we come to know only through interpretation of 
sensory-based representations . We hear ourselves expressing the propositional 
attitudes in inner speech, but those are sensory-based representations, not 
propositional attitudes themselves . In The Centered Mind he expands his sen-
sory-based view in hope of elucidation of the nature of the human thought .
Carruthers believes that we can catch a glimpse of the nature of the hu-
man thought by analysing the stream of consciousness and, more specifically, 
conscious reflection . He wants to provide a theory which will explain what 
determines the contents of the stream of consciousness . In his familiar style, 
he is arguing against two intuitive claims . One of these claims concerns the 
question of propositional attitudes as contents of the stream of consciousness 
and the other one concerns the possibility of passivity of mental activity .
The first intuitive claim he argues against is that amodal propositional at-
titudes occur among the contents of the stream of consciousness . It seems that 
in the stream of representations which occur in our minds there are such things 
as believes, desires, decisions and similar types of attitudes . Everybody agrees 
that in the stream of consciousness there are sensory-based representations such 
as perceptive and imagistic representations, but Carruthers claims that those 
kinds of representations are the only ones which ever appear in the stream of 
consciousness . Amodal propositional attitudes never appear in our reflection!
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Carruthers builds the defence for this claim on the same grounds he 
builds the defence for the claims against introspection in The Opacit of Mind . 
As a starting point he endorses two widely accepted cognitive theories . The 
first one is the global broadcasting theory. Proponents of this theory claim that 
in the human mind there exists a series of specialised mechanisms for solving 
very specific problems . These mechanisms share a global workspace into which 
they broadcast the results of their processes . Once the results are in the global 
workspace, every mechanisms can access it . This enables the mechanisms to 
use the results of many processes without having to preform the processes 
themselves . The second theory which Carruthers builds his defence on is the 
sensory-based theory of working memory. The working memory system is spe-
cific because it can contain and manipulate different kinds of sensory-based 
representations . This is the system which produces our inner speech and the 
stream of visual imagery . There is ample empirical evidence that both the 
working memory system and the global broadcasting architecture are purely 
sensory-based which provides a strong support for the Carruthers’s claim that 
all thought, i .e . all contents of the stream of consciousness, is sensory-based .
There is also a lot of evidence for the claim that the differences in work-
ing memory across the population can explain the differences in general intel-
ligence across the population . Carruthers uses this claim to argue that there is 
no special working memory system in which propositional attitudes interact . 
His argument is a form of the inference to the best explanation . If the human 
mind had such attitudinal working memory system, we would expect it to 
be responsible for the differences in general intelligence between people . But, 
the differences in the general intelligence are best explained by the differences 
in sensory-based working memory system . Therefore, there is no evidence that 
the attitudinal working memory exist, and the best explanation of our stream 
of consciousness is that it is always sensory-based .
The second claim Carruthers argues for in this book is that there is no 
passive (or unpurposeful) mental activity . Intuitively it seems to us that men-
tal activity takes both forms, passive and active . An example of active mental 
activity is solving a mathematical problem in one’s head . When a song comes 
to our mind, seemingly without reason, we believe that it is a form of passive 
mental activity . But Carruthers claims that even those instances of mental 
activity which seem passive are in fact active in the same sense as those which 
seem active . The difference is that we sometimes believe we know why we 
entertain a certain thought and sometimes we believe we don’t know why we 
entertain a certain thought . We characterise as passive those mental activities 
for which we believe we do not know the reason why they occur .
To support this claim more firmly Carruthers proposes that all mental 
activity is actually mental rehearsal, which is controlled by the suppressing of 
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our mental action plans . When we speak, act or decide to do something we 
create a mental action plan which instructs the executive systems what to do . 
So when we want to say something we create an action plan of the exact bod-
ily movements needed to utter a certain sentence .2 Sometimes we suppress 
our action plans from causing our bodily movements which results in mental 
rehearsal of that action . Mental rehearsal is actually mental imagery – inner 
speech, visual imagery, proprioceptive imagery… Because mental rehearsal is 
actually the same process as normal action, only without the last step – the 
execution of bodily movements, Carruthers concludes that mental rehearsal 
is also a type of action . Therefore, all mental activity is best explained as ac-
tive .
To recapitulate Carruthers’s story . The system in which the stream of 
consciousness and conscious reflection take place is the working memory 
system . Contrary to the intuitive view, propositional attitudes never occur in 
the working memory system, i .e . in the stream of consciousness . Therefore, 
the stream of consciousness is always sensory-based, with propositional at-
titudes only bound into sensory representations (seeing something (x) as a 
car has bound into itself a decision that something (x) is a car) . Propositional 
attitudes, nevertheless, are real . Their role is executive, in directing our at-
tention . The focus of our attention is determined by our beliefs, desires and 
conclusions . Sometimes it is not hard to see which propositional attitudes 
directed our attention and sometimes this seems impossible . In the first case 
we think of our mental activity as active, and in the second case we think of it 
as passive . But in fact all mental activity is active because all mental activity is 
the result of the same process of suppressing our mental action plans .
As Carruthers says in the concluding chapter of his book, the overall 
argument of the book is an inference to the best explanation . The best ex-
planation of the stream of consciousness is that it is always sensory-based . 
Carruthers supports this claim with a number of other inferences to the best 
explanation – that the contents of working memory are always sensory-based, 
that the differences in the general intelligence are due to the differences in 
sensory-based working memory, that humans could not have evolved an at-
titudinal workspace because of the more ancient cognitive structures, that we 
never have introspective access to our propositional attitudes (this was the 
conclusion of his last book, and the overall argument of that book was also 
an inference to the best explanation supported by a number of other infer-
ences to the best explanation) . This is the source of my biggest concern about 
this book – a concern which can perhaps be extended to the whole project of 
2 What we “want” to say or do is determined by our attentional systems . The focus of our 
attention is determined by our amodal propositional attitudes . This is the place and the role 
for the propositional attitudes in Carruthers’s cognitive architecture .
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explaining the mind in terms of computational cognitive science . Inference 
to the best explanation is a valid form of an argument . But it seems that an 
argument which has a form of an inference to the best explanation and is 
supported by a number of other inferences to the best explanation, which are 
supported by a number of other inferences to the best explanation, loses a 
little bit of plausibility with every inference to the best explanation provided 
in its support . Every particular inference is plausible, but in the end we are 
left with a weird feeling that we have accepted an argument which is not sup-
ported well-enough .
In the end, I would like to say that The Centered Mind is an excellent 
book and one of the best examples of efforts to explain the mind scientifi-
cally . The book is definitely not an introductory one, but I would recom-
mend it to anyone who is interested in a scientific explanation of the stream 
of consciousness because Caruthers’s clear writing and thorough referencing 
makes the book accessible even to beginners .
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Elvio Baccarini, In a Better World: Public Reason and Biotechnologies 
(Rijeka: University of Rijeka and Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, 2015), 170 pp .
Many books have been published trying to determine the moral status of 
the use of some biotechnologies (e .g . genetic interventions, cloning, moral 
bioenhancement and the extension of human lifespan) . Practical ethics has 
been trying to answer these and similar moral problems for more than a 
century, and all this time the central question has been “What is the right 
thing to do?” . In his recent book Elvio Baccarini does not address this ques-
tion – well aware that in the conditions of reasonable pluralism of moral and 
religious doctrines we cannot publicly agree upon what should we do as a 
political community and which laws and policies are the right or the virtu-
ous ones, he shifts the central question from the domain of practical ethics 
to the domain of political philosophy by asking “What is the legitimate thing 
